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TRANSFORMATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC CASE FOR JUDICIAL

REVIEW: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

Dennis M. Davist
In 1994, South Africans voted in the country's first democratic election. In
doing so, South Africans chose to be governed by a written constitution that
included an ambitious bill of rights. I That document has been termed transformative by the Constitutional Court 2 and many commentators. 3 In a recent public
lecture, Chief Justice Langa spoke of the text as a design to heal the wounds of
the past and guide the country towards a better future. 4 Viewed in this way, the
Chief Justice argued that the Constitution is in part a bridge between the unstable
past and the uncertain future.5 The Chief Justice continued in describing that a
transformative constitution represents something greater, and may in fact be:
[a] way of looking at the world that creates a space which dialogue and
contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly
explored and created, accepted and rejected, and in which change is un6
predictable, but the idea of change is constant.
A careful reading of the Constitution supports the argument that the Constitution seeks the transformation of the society through the construction of a multicultural social democracy in South Africa. 7 This description of the Constitution
as a societal transformative document is supported by the following seven provisions found within the text of the Constitution.
First, section 9 of the Constitution supports the conception of substantive
equality in which the material conditions of citizens must be interrogated in promotion of the equality guarantee. In addition, section 9(3) contains a powerful
I Judge of the High Court of South Africa. Honourable Professor of Law at the University of Cape
Town.
I See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993
[hereinafter "Interim Constitution"] (initially the supreme law of South Africa was the Interim Constitution, passed by the 'white Parliament' following negotiations at the multi party negotiating forum). This
Constitution was of application until the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly passed into law
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; see HASSAN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A
NATION: CONSTrrUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (Cape Town: Oxford 1998) (discussing its
formulation).
2 See S v Makawanyane & Others 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 262 (S. Afr.) (proclaiming the
transformative quality of the text in the Constitutional Court's first case addressing the issue, with then
President of the Court Arthur Chaskalson).
3 See Pius Langa, Chief Justice of South African Constitutional Court, Lecture at the University of
Stellenbosch, South Africa: Transformative Constitutionalism (Oct. 9, 2006) availableat http://law.sun.
ac.za/LangaSpeech.pdf (discussing the most recent criticism).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 5.
6

Id.

7

See generally Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, S. AFR.
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anti-discrimination clause, which protects citizens not only against discrimination
on the grounds of race and gender, but also on the grounds of sexual orientation,
age, belief, opinion, and arguably, class.
Secondly, section 8 of the Constitution provides for the horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights. In short, all power, whether originating in the state or in
private organizations, is subject to scrutiny in terms of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, whenever this power is exercised in the public domain.
Next, section 23 protects a range of labour rights, including the right to strike,
the right to organize collectively, and the right to form trade unions.
The fourth provision contains a range of socio-economic rights; these rights
include the right to housing 8 and the right to health. 9 However interpreted, these
clauses impose an obligation upon the State to ensure that no socio-economic
programme can be introduced without taking account of the priorities of the
poorest of the poor within South African society.
Section 31 of the Constitution contains a guarantee of cultural rights, and
seeks to ensure that cultural identity is protected.
The sixth provision, which supports the Constitution as a societal transformative document, describes the foundational values of the constitutional text as an
amalgam of equality, dignity, and freedom. Taken together, these values are different from the meaning of the parts. For example, it is not possible to contend
10
for a negative conception of freedom as made famous by Isaiah Berlin. The
values of equality, dignity, and freedom provide the foundation upon which the
constitutional text is based, a foundation upon which an egalitarian vision of
South African society emerges. In terms of such vision, freedom without recognition of equality and dignity, and conversely equality, which crowds out freedom and individual dignity, cannot be sustained.
Finally, section 36 of the Constitution contains a limitation clause to ensure
that the rights in the Constitution do not trump the policy of the democratically
elected government. However, the government has to show adequate justification for the limitation if any policy restricts a constitutionally entrenched right.
By ensuring a culture of justification rather than a juristocracy prevailed in the
Constitution, the drafters sought to achieve a balance between constitutionalism
and majoritarian democracy. The Constitution demands judges examine the justification for policy, rather then seek to impose their own policies, which would
tilt the balance of power in favour of government by judiciary. A constitution
which did not have this balance between constitutionalism and majoritarian democracy, and allowed judges to impose their own policies, would arguably erode
democratic rule and invariably, erode the legitimacy of the constitutional
enterprise.
8

Id. at

§ 26.

9

Id. at

§ 27.

10

ISAIAH BERLIN,

Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four ESSAYS

ON LIBERTY

121-22 (Oxford University

Press 1969).

46
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The Constitutional Court and Democracy
From 1994 to 2004, the South African public appeared to embrace the possibility of change as envisaged by the democratic model adopted in 1994. A decade later, if you listen to any talk radio program you will hear complaints about
the Constitution; complaints that range from the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty, to the recognition of gay marriage, and to the provision of procedural
safeguards for the criminally accused. The common themes in the complaints
are: 1.) a majority of citizens are opposed to these constitutional provisions as
interpreted by the Constitutional Court; 2.) that hence it is undemocratic to prevent majority opinion from being implemented; and 3.) that the gap between
majority opinion and the decision to declare the death penalty to be unconstitutional, for example, will cause the legal system to be viewed as illegitimate.
This vocal form of protest against the practice in a constitutional democracy
where judges interpret a text called a written constitution, brings up two interrelated issues. First, why should the majority public opinion on important matters
of public policy be constrained in perpetuity by a legal text, which, secondly, is
interpreted by unelected judges who follow their own values in giving content to
this text? The answers to these questions are not obvious, and unsurprisingly,
South African judges hold differing opinions.
A recent decision of the Constitutional Court dealing with a challenge to an
amendment to the laws governing termination of pregnancies is illustrative.II
This decision reveals differences between the judges as to the role of courts in a
constitutional democracy. 1 2 In this case, a group named Doctors for Life complained that the National Council of Provinces ("NCOP") 13 passed certain health
bills, including the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act, 14
without holding proper public hearings and ensuring adequate public participation. The failure of provincial legislatures to hold public hearings also became
relevant, because the provinces are critical to the very purpose of the NCOP.15
Writing for the majority of the court, Justice Sandile Ngcobo correctly noted
that this case contained an important question on the role of the public in the
lawmaking process, and thus was "at the heart of our constitutional democracy."16 One important issue in the Doctors for Life case concerned the nature
and scope of the constitutional obligations of a 'legislative organ' of the state to
facilitate public involvement in its legislative process, along with the obligations
11 Doctorsfor Life Int'l v Speaker of the Nat'l Assembly, 2006 Case No. CCT 12/05 (CC) (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/7605.PDF [hereinafter Doctors For Life
Int'l].

12 Id. at para. 227.
13 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 7, at § 42-82 (The National Council of Provinces is the upper
house of Parliament. It consists of 90 delegates, of whom each of the 9 Provinces are entitled to 10
delegates. It is modeled on the German Bundesrat).
14 Doctorsfor Life Int'l, supra note 11, at para. 2-3.
15 Id. at para. 5.
16 Id. at para. 1.
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of legislative committees.' 7 Another important issue concerned the extent to
which the Constitutional Court may interfere in the processes of a legislative
18
body in order to enforce the obligation to facilitate such public involvement.
Justice Ngcobo exhaustively examined the constitutional importance of public
involvement in the law making process. 19 He noted that:
In the overall scheme of the Constitution, the representative and participatory elements of our democracy should not be seen in tension with
each other. They must be seen as mutually supportive. General elections,
the foundation of representative democracy, would be meaningless without massive participation by the voters. The participation by the public
basis provides vitality to the functioning of representative
on a continuous
20
democracy.
Later in his judgment, Justice Ngcobo observed that within African communities, the "imbizo" or "legotla" are the traditional methods of public participation,
which should infuse the constitutional idea of participation in the legislative process.2 ' Hence the principles to be protected by the court included the duty to
provide meaningful opportunities for public participation in the law-making prothat "people have the ability to
cess, and the duty to take measures that ensured
' 22
take advantage of the opportunities provided.
The majority of the court went on to hold that the NCOP has an important role
to play in the national law-making process. 23 The NCOP represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into consideration in the national law-making process.2 4 In doing so, the provinces give voting mandates to
their NCOP delegations. 25 Further, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
have broad discretion to determine how best to fulfill their constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement in a given case, as long as it is reasonable to
do so. 26 The Court would not prescribe to Parliament what the manner or mechanisms of public participation should be, as the Court determined that the choice
since the Court's only task is to ensure that reasonashould be left to Parliament
27
ble steps were taken.

However, the Court went on to say that the duty will often require Parliament
and the provincial legislatures to provide citizens with a meaningful opportunity
17 Id. at para. 206.

Id. at para. 211.
19 See id. at para. 135.
20 Id. at para. 115.
18

21 Id. at para. 101 (discussing the Imbizo or legotla as indigenous descriptions for public consultation
of the applicable community).
22 Id. at para. 129.
23 Id. at para. 84.
24 Id. at para. 86.

48

25

Id.

26

Id. at para. 145.

27

Id. at para. 129; see also id. at para. 146.

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 5, Issue I

The South African Experience
to be heard in the making of laws that will govern them. 2 8 In determining
whether Parliament has acted reasonably, the Court will need to consider a number of factors, including the nature of the legislation and what Parliament itself
the appropriate method of facilitating public involvement
has assessed as being
29
in a particular case.
On the facts, Justice Ngcobo found that the Traditional Health Practitioners
Act30 and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 3 l had generated great public interest at the NCOP, as evidenced by requests for public hearings. 32 In recognition thereof, the NCOP decided that public hearings would be
held in the provinces and advised the interested groups of this fact. 33 However, a
majority of the provinces did not hold hearings on these Bills because there was
insufficient time to do so. Although this was known to the NCOP, they still did
not hold public hearings. 34 For these reasons, Justice Ngcobo held that the failure by the NCOP to hold public hearings, in relation to the Traditional Health
Practitioners Act and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act,
was unreasonable. 35 He concluded that the NCOP did not comply with its oblipublic involvement, as contemplated by Section 72 of the
gation to facilitate
36
Constitution.
The majority of the Court thus decided that Parliament, in particular the
NCOP, had not discharged its constitutional obligation of conducting sufficient
37
public hearings before passing legislation of considerable public interest.
Therefore, the court insisted upon a dialogical process between the democrati38
cally elected legislature and the public before the amendment became law.
In contrast, Justice Zac Yacoob, in a minority judgment, held that the Court
should not impose obligations of consultation upon a democratically elected legislature. 39 By doing so the Court would undermine the scope of the legislature
and the right to vote, which was designed to elect public representatives who
would then have autonomy to make decisions on behalf of the public. 40 The core
of Justice Yacoob's reasoning is found in the following passage:
28 Id. at para. 145.
29 Id. at para. 128.
30 Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004.
31 Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 38 of 2004.
32 Doctors for Life Int'l, supra note 11, at para. 156.
33 Id. at 158.
34 Id. at

188.

35 Id. at 189.

36 Id. at 195; see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 7, at § 72(l)(a) ("Public access to and
involvement in National Council," provides that the NCOP must "facilitate public involvement in the
legislative and other processes of the Council and its committees").
37 Doctorsfor Life Int'l, supra note 11, at para. 213.
38 Id.

39 Id. at para. 283 (Yacoob, J., dissenting); see also id. at 337 (Yacoob, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at para. 292 (Yacoob, J., dissenting).
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Citizens of this country cast their votes in favour of political parties represented in the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures. . . It is
these elected representatives that govern the people and their representative activities are the activities of the people. In passing legislation...
members

. . .

do not act on their own whims but represent the people of

this country. To undermine these representatives is to undermine the political will of the people ...Constitutionally speaking it is the people of
41
this country who, through their elected representatives pass laws.

Whereas the minority judgment places great importance on the principle of
representative democracy, the majority insists, with considerable persuasion, that
the South African Constitution enshrines a principle of public deliberation which
not even the peoples' representatives can take away. The division in the Court
illustrates the point of debate, namely: how far should the rule of the Constitutional Court extend over the country's public representatives, including the will
of the voters?
A Juristocracy?
It should be accepted as trite that constitutional jurisprudence is never so text
based that it can be wrenched away from the controversies of political theory.
But if judges are free to give content to open ended constitutional rights in terms
of their own political and jurisprudential commitments, how does the nation ever
achieve constitutional rule based upon a shared set of norms? And if that cannot
be achieved, then, are we not driven back to a majoritarian conception of democracy, which at the very least has the capacity to respond to the political will of the
"people"? Viewed within the context of the case discussed above, this debate
appears to admit a number of different answers. First, the Court extends judicial
review beyond the concerns of traditional rights. It insists that the democratic
model contained in the South African Constitution is one of deliberative, participative democracy, rather then representative democracy, where citizens vote but
once every four or five years. Second, judicial review is confined to narrower
questions of specified rights, and third, that rights should exist without the enforcement mechanism of judicial review.
Ronald Dworkin claims in a recent book that while citizens have a basic right
to democratic procedures, including the right to vote and to participate actively in
politics, there is no basic right to one form of democratic design. 42 In the South
African case, the design chosen and on which citizens voted, was that of constitutional democracy. It cannot be said that by so choosing this model, the citizenry
were duped into an undemocratic form of government. It was chosen by "we the

41

Id.

42 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES,

147-50 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

2006).

50
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people" to ensure that certain foundational rights were enjoyed by all, regardless
43
of access to political power at a transient moment in the history of the nation.
Referring to the argument that this form of political model concentrates too
much power in the hands of the individual judge, who is free to impose his or her
views on the nation, Dworkin argues that judges do make value judgments when
they decide these cases. 44 However, he adds that these are value judgments that
need to make sense of the scope and ambition of the constitution read as a
whole. 45 In addition, the doctrine of stare decisis ensures judges are constrained
46
by the reading of previous judicial colleagues confronted with the same clauses.
In other words, judges are not free to impose their own view on the constitution,
of the constitutional text as a whole and
regardless of the text.47 Some reading
48
reference to precedent is required.
Dworkin readily accepts that even the application of precedent requires a value
judgment. 49 Judgments of relevant similarity are not made by mechanistic use of
analogy. Rather, the judge has to determine whether the present dispute is of
sufficient legal equivalence to the previously decided case so as to be followed. 50
Thus the judge does not, on this argument, decide cases by relying on her own
values. 5 1 Instead, she strives to quarry out some more objective approach by
asking what would be just in this situation. The concept of justice is sourced in
52
the principles which underlie the legal system they are enjoined to protect.
Dworkin thus argues that judges must take account of the consequences of their
decisions, not by their political or personal preferences, but directed by principles
embedded in the legal system read as whole. 53 These are principles that guide
as to which consequences are relevant, and how these
the process of adjudication
54
should be weighed.
No matter the plausibility of this theory, the meaning of the constitutional text
is invariably controversial and will remain contested. Legal values, such as predictability and clarity, simply do not stack up. These values give way invariably
to argumentation and contestation of legal principle. As Jeremy Waldron observes in his review of Dworkin's book:
43 For a thoughtful discussion on the negotiations that guided the transition to democracy, see ALLISTER SPARKS,

TOMORROW

is ANOTHER CouNTY:

THE

INSIDE STORY OF SouTH AFRICA'S

ROAD TO

CHANGE (University of Chicago Press 1992).
44 DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 144.
45
46

Id. at 117-39.
Id. at 123.

47 Id.
48

Id. at 117-39.

49 Id. at 144.
50

Id. at

5'

Id. at 117-39.

52

Id.
Id.
Id.

53
54

127.
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Citizens cannot plausibly insist that judges turn themselves into machines, that they reason in exactly the same way, or that they avoid any
intellectual exertions that might show up the differences in values between them. But they can insist that any judge addressing their case
should try as hard as he can, by his own lights, to judge them by standards
55
that they have applied to others.
A Dworkinian account of adjudication should not be adhered to since Dworkin's theory has been rigorously exposed from a non-foundationalist perspective.
Non-foundationalists contend that a judge engages with the legal materials in
question, and shapes these to fit the resolution of the dispute before her, in a
manner that advances justice. Given that justice is an interpretive concept, and
that judges may well seek to justify the chosen interpretation initially in the community's own understanding of what justice consists, this notion of a community
meaning is invariably a contested concept. There is no single foundationalist key
to unlock the problem. A "right" answer, in short, depends upon the reading of
an individual judge or judges, located within a particular legal community with
its own transient, but specific reading.
When judges seek to advance justice through law, "[they] do not pronounce ex
cathedra, but creatively reshape old material into new designs". 56 As the Canadian constitutional scholar, Alan Hutchinson, 'comments, the "legal past" does
57
not pull judges back, but rather "impels them forward" in their quest for justice.
As he states:
As such, great judges do not ignore the past nor obsess about it, but they
work the past so as to realise its present possibilities for future innovation: they commit themselves to persuading us that the legal materials in
the justice they might give rise to can be and ought to be seen in a very
different light and shape... Judges are to be judged by the political merit
of their practical performances, and not the conceptual coherence of their
5 8
theoretical reflections.
If the non-foundationalist account of adjudication is accepted, then there is
simply no easy walk to judicial objectivity. No set of principles which Hercules,
Dworkin's model judge, would be able to glean from the body of legal materials
would allow him to produce but one correct answer in the image of Law's Em55 Jeremy Waldron, How Judges Should Judge, 53 NEW YORK REVIEW OF
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article-id= 19216.

BOOKS

(2006), available

A NONFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNr OF LAW AND
322 (Duke University Press 2000). Apart from Hutchinson's work, which usefully exposes Dworkin, reference must be made to A Critique of Adjudication by Duncan Kennedy, the most
rigorous progressive examination of adjudication and its profound limitations and ambiguities. See
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (Harvard University Press 1997). Within the South
African context, see the seminal article: Karl Kare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism,
14 S. AFR. J. OF HuM. RTS. 146 (1998).
56 ALAN HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME:

ADJUDICATION

57 HUTCHINSON,
58

52

sapra note 56, at 323

Id.
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pire.59 Where then does this lead us in an attempt to develop an understanding of
adjudication? Hutchinson suggests that by way of a case-by-case development of
the law, judges will not feel obliged to revere present legal or political arrangements or revise them for the sake of it, but rather, "[t]hey will work to adapt legal
and practice of social
doctrine so that it can accommodate to the understanding
60
possibilities.
dynamic
of
game
fluid
a
life as
This approach espoused by Hutchinson appears similar to that advocated by
Chief Justice Langa. This is particularly true where the Chief Justice argues that
transformation is inherently fluid as the country moves haltingly toward a just
6
future, where justice is never settled nor ultimately determined. ' In the same
way, adjudication is never settled, for contestation and dialogue about judicial
decisions can never be circumvented. For this reason, the Dworkinian demands
for coherence and integrity notwithstanding, the interpretations of the judiciary
will continue to be controversial, as will the extent to which the judiciary constitutionally interferes in the formulation and execution of public policy.
It is for this reason that theorists like Jeremy Waldron and Mark Tushnet have
argued that because disagreements about rights are not unreasonable and that
legitimate differences are inevitable, it is important that such disagreements are
resolved by means of responsible deliberative mechanisms. 62 They contend that
ordinary legislative procedures do this best, and that recourse to the elitism of a
judiciary adds little to the process, save to produce a disenfranchisement and
legalistic obfuscation of the fundamental moral disagreements in society about
rights.

63

Waldron contends that we overestimate the purchase of judicial review as a
means to protect rights. 64 Deliberative processes by way of the legislature are the
more democratic route. 65 Yet Waldron concedes that his model only works
where four assumptions operate. 66 These include, first, that democratic institutions are in reasonably good working order; second, a set of judicial institutions
in reasonably good working order to settle disputes and uphold the rule of law;
third, that there is a general commitment on the part of most members of a society to the idea of individual and minority rights;67and fourth, that there is a persistent and good faith disagreement about rights.
Significantly, Waldron accepts that the development of a rights culture can
and often is accompanied by a Bill of Rights, but that the intervention of an elitist
59 See generally, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
1986).
60 HUTCHINSON, supra note 56, at 327.
61 Langa, supra note 3, at 4.
62 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1366-69,
1371-73, 1386-95 (2006); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, 137-

52 (Princeton University Press 1999).
63 Waldron, supra note 62; Tushnet, supra note 62.
64 Waldron, supra note 62, at 1353.
65 Id. at 1349-50, 1353.
66 Id. at 1360.
67 Id.

Volume 5, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

The South African Experience

conception of review by unelected judges converts a rights enterprise into something undemocratic. 68 Waldron objects to strong judicial review where courts
have the power to set aside legislation passed by a democratically elected legislature. 69 He appears to adopt the view that as rights are invariably the subject of
normative disagreement, it would be best if the disputes are settled in the most
70
democratically constituted of institutions, namely, the legislature.
Outside of Waldron's birth country of New Zealand, it is difficult to conceive
of countries where recourse alone to legislative deliberation is going to promote
and protect a rights culture. In many instances, it is the legislative product of the
legislature that undermines the rights of citizens. The admission of inherent disagreement about the nature of rights means that a legislature can hardly be immune from this problem. To argue that an electorate may vote out such a body at
the next election is hardly of comfort to those who may suffer for years before an
amendment is effected. This view also ignores the importance of having rules for
the political game that allow for fair participation and which trump the kind of
prejudice that relegates the potential role of a segment of society to second class
citizenship.
The example of the case of gay marriage may suffice. In Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fourie, Justice Sachs, on behalf of the majority of the Constitutional
Court, held that. "[a] democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally, egalitarian society embraces everyone and accepts people for who they are.''71 He then
referenced to the vision of an open and democratic society contemplated by the
Constitution. 72 Justice Sachs noted that:
There must be mutually respectful co-existence between the secular and
the sacred. The function of the Court is to recognise the sphere which
each inhabits, not to force the one into the sphere of the other .... [T]he
test, whether majoritarian or minoritarian positions are involved, must always be whether the measure under scrutiny promotes or retards the
achievement of human dignity, equality and freedom. 7 3
In deciding that the law was unconstitutional in not granting the same status to
gay marriage as it did to heterosexual marriages, the Court asserted that the present law "manifestly affects" the dignity of gays and lesbians as full members of
South African society. 74 In this decision, the Court protected the autonomy of all
who make up South African society, thereby promoting the conditions in which
all may participate fairly in the political process. The decision, on its own, does
not undermine democracy. On the contrary, it promotes a form of democracy
that recognises the role of democratically elected institutions, both in the defer68

Id. at 1358.

69 Id. at 1349-50, 1353.
70

Id.

71 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), para. 60 (S.Afr.).
73

Id. at para. 89.
Id. at para. 94.

74

Id. at para 114.

72

54

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 5, Issue I

The South African Experience
ence courts show to the role of these bodies, and by the application of a limitation
clause in the Bill of Rights, in terms of which legislation may be held to trump a
constitutionally entrenched right. In addition, the protection and promotion of
self-autonomy allows for individuals to coalesce into civic movements that in
turn can enjoy a dialogic relationship with both the courts and the legislature.
75
A Response to Waldron, Tushnet, and the South African Majoritarians

The case in favour of the constitutionally entrenched model which includes a
judicial role can be summarised as follows. First, the design of the South African
Constitution was intended to ensure that neither judges, the executive, nor legislature ran the country exclusively. But how they do it together, and more particularly the role that the judiciary plays in this democratic model, should always be
the subject of rigorous public debate. Second, the very purpose of a constitution
76
of the model embraced by South Africa is to secure for each permanent resident
the conditions under which each person can enjoy the value of autonomy, and
can participate in the formulation and development of public reason.
To the extent that the South African Constitution extends way beyond the
protection of civil and political rights, it may be argued that the model guarantees, in part, a juristocracy whereby judges can trump the distributive decisions
best left to the legislature and executive. 77 The provisions in the South African
Constitution of socio-economic rights, often viewed with suspicion by majoritarians and libertarian constitutionalists, can be justified within this theoretical
framework. In a recent contribution to this debate, Canadian theorist, Alan
Brudner, captures the point:
A claim of right to social and economical equality is consistent with the
worth of the contingent person if it is justified by a principle of equal
concern for each person's success in leading a self-authored life with the
contingent endowments in which his personhood is uniquely . . . ex[P]eople may claim protection against the external circumpressed ....

stances of their own lives that are unfavourable to self-authorship... 78
This second response to the type of majoritarianism illustrated by Waldron
must come with a caution: where the courts do not respect the legislature's reasonable judgment as to whether the legislative programme promotes and protects
75 As an indication of the way in which (hopefully) transient considerations influence the discourse,
the current crime wave in South Africa has powered a furious attack on the Constitutional Courts finding
that the death penalty is unconstitutional. An article that appeared in the Cape Times, authored by a
recent appointment to the Bench Judge John Murphy, makes a call for a referendum with great
enthusiasm. In this case, the judge was not seized with a difficult, emotionally draining case. Rather, a
sitting judge wrote an article for the popular press in which he called for a public reconsideration of the
constitution as interpreted by the constitutional court, contending that current public opinion must be
given its day. John Murphy, Face Death Penalty Head-on, CAPE TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006.
76 I employ this term, rather then the term "citizen," as rights in the constitution are enjoyed by a
larger group then citizens.
77 See generally S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 7.
78 ALAN BRUDNER, CONSTrrTIONAL GOODS 264 (Oxford University Press 2004) (emphasis omitted).
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rights to the maximum extent possible with available public means, or the executive's similarly based implementation, then the courts encroach into the political
territory of representative politics. Again this is better stated in theory then it is
implemented in practice. The question that must be addressed concerns the problem of the elected bodies developing policies that run counter to the vision of the
constitution. Then the best that courts can do is to adjudicate in terms of an
articulated theory of the constitution, which in turn is the subject of public deliberation. Both the pressure from civic movements and the deliberative role of the
legislature constitute pressure points upon the judiciary in its development of the
constitutional text.
Conclusion
Perhaps it is necessary to conclude with the following reminder that constitutions are not all the same and not one size fits all. Yash Ghai warns of this in his
conclusion to an analysis of comparative constitutions, in which he suggests that
similar language and seemingly common concepts are deceptive. He states,
"comparative constitutional law has become mired in formalism and pseudo-uni-
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versalism and the wonderful multiplicity of the constitution has become lost."

We should develop our analysis not in the pseudo-democratic claim about
majority opinion at a point in history, but with the possibility of embracing three
coordinating strands for the South African democracy. These include: a deliberative legislature, a judiciary which promotes the procedural and substantive conditions for political participation, and civil society where those conditions are
utilized by autonomous citizens uniting in a common political purpose.
This roots the Constitution in South African history, but with a clear transformative possibility. The representative model of democracy has a much contested pedigree in South Africa because it was employed to shore up white rule
from 1910 to 1994. However, it is now the subject of transformation, namely,
from a mechanism of white oppression of the majority, to that of means where
public representatives elected by the people can produce a legislative programme
for the reconstruction of the country. The Bill of Rights finds its political roots in
the African Claims of 1943 and the Freedom Charter of 1955, where the African
National Congress took the lead and campaigned for a Bill of Rights for the
country, in which "all should enjoy human rights" became a foundational part of
the political opposition to apartheid.8 0 Hence fundamental human rights were
part of the political discourse that led to the adoption of the Constitution.
However, the history of South Africa is also one of a rich deliberative democracy in which civil society led the political way, by ensuring that the activity of
civic groupings shaped the very political programmes that became the stuff of
79 Yash Ghai, A Journey Around Constitutions: Reflections on Contemporary Constitutions, 122 S.
AFR. L.J. 804, 831 (2005).
80 For the texts of these two documents, see Ebrahim, supra note 1, at 396, 415.
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struggle. 8' Hence the idea, as set out by Justice Ngcobo in the case of Doctors
for Life International,in which civil society is able to convert Parliament into a
transmission belt for the implementation of the wishes of "the people," is one that
82
is grounded in a rich and effective political tradition.
The debate conducted around the democratic claim of constitutional review is
all too often couched in binary terms. On the one hand, there is the exhortation
that the disputes about rights should be left to the democratically elected body
and, on the other hand, proponents argue that only a dispassionate institution
such as a judiciary should adjudicate on these disagreements. South African legislation and policy are developed and executed by bodies chosen, whether directly or indirectly, by the people. Although for the phrase "we the people" to
participate meaningfully, and to guarantee the autonomy of each individual to
experience a self-authored life, a Bill of Rights which is developed by a judiciary, subject in turn to critical public evaluation, contributes to the enhancement
of democracy. In turn, that process of critical evaluation of all three arms of
state, is generated by means of a civil society made up of self-authored beings
whose autonomy cannot be taken away by the irate holders of public power, save
in terms of clear public justification.
This three pronged model of democracy moves beyond the sterile debates
about the democratic pedigree of judicial review. By contrast, it promotes a form
of deliberative democracy which holds the promise of transformation of democracy beyond public participation every five years at the ballot box. It also eschews the elitism of a judiciary subsuming politics into a complex, arcane
legalese of which only the modem day philosopher kings can decipher. It is a
model of democracy that is deeply rooted in the political history of South Africa.

81 For an example of the nature of civic political struggle and its tradition within South Africa, see
UDF: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED DEMOCRACTIC FRONT IN SOUTH AFRICA 19831991, (Ohio University Press) (2000).
82 See generally Doctors for Life Int'l, supra note 11.
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